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1. Preliminaries
1.1 Samuelson and Modern Economics1
The formative period in the emergence of modern economics was the decade 
centered on the Second World War. This 
1 EBWP—Edwin Bidwell Wilson Papers, Harvard 
University, HUG4878.203. Quotations are courtesy of 
Harvard University Archives. HUP—Archives of Harvard 
University Press, Foundations of Economic Analysis folder. 
I thank Harvard University Press for providing access to 
the editorial files from which I quote with their permission.
PASP—Paul A. Samuelson Papers, Rubenstein Rare Book 
and Manuscript Library, Duke University (followed by Box 
number and folder name).
decade witnessed the takeoff in the idea 
that mathematical modeling was central to 
both economic theory and empirical work, 
two facets of economics that were increas-
ingly separated. Whereas some of the most 
prominent theorists of the interwar period 
(e.g. Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, Allyn 
Young, John Maurice Clark, or Edward 
Chamberlin) were uncomfortable about 
using what would now be considered basic 
mathematics, after the Second World War, 
economic theory became progressively more 
mathematical. There was a similar transition 
in empirical work, where there was a change 
from the empirical work represented by 
Wesley Mitchell and Gardner Means—data 
intensive, but involving no formal statisti-
cal inference—to the methods of modern 
econometrics, though limitations of the com-
puting power available to economists held 
back the spread of formal statistical model-
ing and inference for many years. Symbolic 
of this change in economics was the rise to 
prominence of the economics department at 
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the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT). A department of social science that 
in 1940 was still focused on providing service 
teaching for engineers became, by the 1960s, 
one of the most important economics gradu-
ate schools in the world. Economics at MIT 
was part of not just an engineering school, 
but the engineering school that had received 
the lion’s share of wartime science funding 
and, with its massive research laboratories 
had become one of the preeminent locations 
of “big science.”2
One of the leading figures in this transition 
was the winner of the AEA’s first (1947) John 
Bates Clark Medal, Paul Anthony Samuelson. 
As Junior Fellow at Harvard from 1937 to 
1940, he wrote a series of papers that changed 
the basis on which theoretical debates were 
conducted in several fields: consumer the-
ory (revealed preference), the theory of 
international trade (the Heckscher–Ohlin–
Samuelson model), Keynesian economics, 
and the business cycle (the multiplier-accel-
erator model). He formalized the problem 
of dynamic analysis in economics, bringing 
these ideas together, along with a codification 
of welfare economics, in a book, Foundations 
of Economic Analysis (1947). For decades, 
this book was a core graduate microeco-
nomics textbook and, for many economists, 
defined the way to do economic theory. For 
example, in 1960, having read in one of his 
textbooks that it was “the most important 
book in economics since the war,” Robert 
E. Lucas (1995) taught himself economic 
theory by reading its early chapters, apply-
ing the techniques he learned from it to the 
problems that Milton Friedman posed in his 
Chicago price theory course.3
Samuelson’s own career illustrates the 
way economics changed during this period. 
2  On economics at MIT, see the articles in Weintraub 
(2014a), in particular Cherrier (2014).
3 Friedman’s treatment of these problems was largely 
intuitive and graphical.
As a graduate student at Harvard, he was 
 considered a specialist in a field called 
“ mathematical economics,” in which posts 
were so difficult to find that his teachers 
feared that he might never land an academic 
position. At MIT, his mathematical skills were 
more highly valued because every student 
in the institute was required to study math 
and physics, but he moved very reluctantly 
because he wanted to remain in Harvard’s 
much stronger department. Even this oppor-
tunity presented itself only because a vacancy 
arose at short notice when staff were lost 
through preparations for war (see Backhouse 
2014). In contrast, by 1948, Samuelson was a 
full professor who was being sounded out by 
most of the leading departments, including 
Chicago, which came closer than any other 
university to luring him away.4 He committed 
himself to MIT, where he spent the rest of 
his long career. According to President James 
Killian, the success of MIT’s economics 
department was due to Samuelson and the 
distinguished economists who found satisfac-
tion in being his colleagues.5
Clearly, other works were important in the 
rise of mathematical modeling in econom-
ics, notably John Hicks’s Value and Capital 
(1939), which introduced many economists 
to more formal general equilibrium analy-
sis, and The Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern (1944). However, though The 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
was well known among mathematical econ-
omists, game theory did not acquire its pres-
ent status in the discipline until much later, 
and when it did, it was the noncooperative 
theory of John Nash to which most econo-
mists turned, rather than to von Neumann’s 
and Morgenstern’s model of coalition 
 formation. And though Hicks might have 
4 See Maas (2014). Harvard did not try because they 
knew he would prefer to stay at MIT.
5 Killian (1985).
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been first, it was Samuelson’s Foundations, 
with its focus on providing the mathematical 
and conceptual tools with which comparative 
statics results could be generated, that came 
to define the way most economic theorizing 
was done. Samuelson’s best-selling elemen-
tary textbook (1948), the increasing promi-
nence of the MIT economics department, 
his prominent involvement in debates over 
public policy, and a succession of widely cited 
theoretical innovations all served to confirm 
his dominance of economics worldwide, and 
with it the status of Foundations.6 In consid-
ering the origins of Foundations, we come 
closer to seeing the origins of modern, tech-
nical economics than we do by looking at any 
other work.
1.2 “How Foundations Came to Be”
Given the importance of the book, it is 
not surprising that when Samuelson offered 
“How Foundations Came to Be,” an abridged 
version of a paper first published in German 
(1997), John Macmillan immediately 
accepted it for the JEL, telling Samuelson, 
“How one of the great economics books 
came to be written makes a wonderful JEL 
topic.”7 In this article, Samuelson reflected 
on the book’s origins as a Harvard PhD the-
sis (1940) and the reasons for the long delay 
between his first having the main ideas and 
the book’s eventual publication. The thesis 
was not written until 1940 because he was 
precluded from working towards a higher 
degree by the conditions of his junior fel-
lowship at Harvard; publication was then 
delayed, partly because of the Second World 
6 These include the consumption-loan model 
(Samuelson 1958), the pure theory of public goods 
(Samuelson 1954), turnpike theory (Dorfman, Samuelson, 
and Solow 1958), the use of the Phillips curve (Samuelson 
and Solow 1960), and the theory of efficient markets 
(Samuelson 1965a).
7 McMillan J, January 26, 1998, Letter to Samuelson, 
AEA Papers, Duke University 2004–0007, Box 3 
(Samuelson).
War and partly because of the anti-theory 
prejudices of Harold Burbank, the Head of 
Harvard’s economics department, on whose 
desk it sat gathering dust before being sent 
to Harvard University Press. 
This paper reexamines the origins 
of Foundations using evidence from 
Samuelson’s papers (archived at Duke 
University) and the archives of the 
Harvard Economics Department and 
Harvard University Press. Samuelson’s own 
account remains indispensable, but needs 
 reexamination. As people reflect on past 
events, points that seem significant in view 
of their later interpretation of their own lives 
get elaborated and modified so that their 
stories become more coherent (see Tribe 
1997, pp. 6–9; Weintraub 2007). Samuelson 
was no exception to this rule. He was a great 
raconteur who was forever recalling events 
from his own past. The inevitable result was 
that the details he recalled most clearly were 
those that fit his own perception of his life.
A good illustration is provided by the 
account of the publication process of 
Foundations in “How Foundations Came to 
Be.” Late in life, Samuelson paid much more 
attention than he had earlier to the antisem-
itism that pervaded Harvard in the 1930s, 
department chair Harold Burbank heading a 
“roll of dishonor” he sent to his friend Henry 
Rosovsky in 1989.8 That animosity could 
explain why he blamed Burbank for holding 
up publication of Foundations, for trying to 
limit the print run to only 500 copies, and for 
destroying the type after the first print run. 
He also remembered Burbank as critical of 
him as a young theorist, writing, “Harvard’s 
long-time department chairman [Harold 
Burbank] was no admirer of me; long before 
he had counseled me against working in eco-
nomic theory before I had reached (his) ripe 
old age of 50+” (Samuelson 1998, p. 1378). 
8 Samuelson, September 26, 1989, Letter to Henry 
Rosovsky, PASP Box 63 (Rosovsky).
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Later, in the midst of a published denuncia-
tion of his teachers’ antisemitism, Samuelson 
(Samuelson 2002, p. 51) recalled Burbank’s 
advice and his own response to that advice:,
“Samuelson, you are narrow. Keynes and 
Hawtrey are narrow. Don’t take up economic 
theory until after you are fifty. This is what 
our great Allyn Young used to say.” Alas, I had 
already lost my heart, and aspired to become 
even more narrow; and furthermore, Young 
had died young, just before his rendezvous 
with greatness. . . . I was always a young man 
in a hurry.
The now-puzzling ageism-in-reverse 
reported here reflects the different, non-
mathematical conception of economic the-
ory then prevailing, at least in Burbank’s 
mind. Theory was not thought something 
that required mathematical agility, but the 
mature reflection and experience of an older 
scholar. Samuelson was in a hurry because, 
having been diagnosed as having high blood 
pressure, he expected to die young like his 
father.
In contrast, the archival record shows that, 
while the book did sit on Burbank’s desk for 
a few months (presumably, as Department 
Chair, he had a responsibility to review it 
before sending it to the publishers), it is 
clear that the timing of the book’s publica-
tion was determined by the availability of 
typesetting capacity (not all printers could 
handle the complex mathematics involved), 
and ultimately by the availability of paper 
(a rationed commodity in wartime). It also 
establishes that negotiations with Harvard 
University Press were handled by Abbott 
Usher, not Burbank, that the initial order was 
for 1,200 copies (it is a mystery why only 887 
were eventually shipped, the likely expla-
nation being the availability of paper), and 
that the type was “killed” at the instigation 
of the printers, who pleaded with Harvard 
University Press that the department had no 
understanding of the shortage of type metal, 
then selling for almost double its normal 
price.9 When the type was killed, the war 
had ended and it was assumed that the War 
Production Board would soon revoke con-
trols on the use of paper and it would be easy 
to scale up production quickly.10 Burbank’s 
 antisemitism had affected Samuelson whilst 
he was a student, and there were ample 
grounds for resentment that could have 
affected his later memory, but the delay in 
the publication of Foundations can be fully 
explained by production difficulties.11
In addition, because we are effectively 
tracing the roots of modern economics back 
to the inter-war period, there is also a need 
to tie down the intellectual climate out of 
which Foundations arose. Samuelson was 
extremely generous in giving credit to others, 
notably his teacher and mentor, E. B. Wilson, 
with whom he remained in lifelong contact, 
but he was often vague about what  people 
contributed to Foundations. This may be 
the result of a certain defensiveness in “How 
Foundations Came to Be,” for one of his 
goals in that article was to contest the history 
of dynamics provided in Roy Weintraub’s 
Stabilizing Dynamics (1991), about which he 
had been upset for several years.12 Though 
this chapter sought to place Foundations 
in the intellectual climate in which it was 
 written, Samuelson took him to be suggesting 
that there was “some mystery, and maybe even 
some cover up” (Samuelson 1998, p. 1381). 
Thus, Samuelson (1998, p. 1383) stressed the 
extent to which he was self-taught through 
9  Wilson, C.W., April 18, 1947, Letter to Alfred V. Jules, 
HUP; Jules, A.V., June 18, 1947, Letter to C. W. Wilson, 
HUP. 
10 Wilson, C.W., October 2, 1947, Letter to Alfred V. 
Jules, HUP. Email from Michael Aronson to the author, 
April 9, 2012.
11 The issue of antisemitism is discussed in more detail 
in Weintraub (2014b) and Backhouse (2014).
12 Weintraub says that this was reported to him by 
Robert Summers (Samuelson’s brother) and Lawrence 
Klein (Samuelson’s first PhD student). The original ver-
sion of the JEL article, published in German, discussed 
Weintraub at length.
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hours spent in the Widener Library, asserting 
that he found nothing of interest in Lawrence 
Henderson’s sociology, and recalling that 
when he tried to discuss Willard Gibbs with 
him, Henderson preferred to enumerate the 
failings of Franklin Roosevelt. There is no 
reason to doubt this, but his remark hardly 
addresses the question of whether three years 
of weekly dinners at the Society of Fellows, 
dominated by Henderson, may, directly or 
indirectly, have left more of a mark on his 
thinking than Samuelson remembered.
For these and other reasons, then, it is 
instructive to revisit the process whereby 
Foundations came to be.
2. Graduate Study at Harvard
2.1 Chicago and Harvard
Samuelson, who was born a century ago 
as of May 15, 2015, began his account of 
the origins of Foundations by telling sto-
ries about his childhood, speculating on the 
link between being precocious and having 
“ridiculous” levels of self-confidence, and his 
undergraduate education at Chicago. Aaron 
Director introduced him to economics with a 
very traditional economic principles course, 
but one in which he drew attention to the 
equations for general equilibrium in Gustav 
Cassel’s Theory of Social Economy (1923). In 
his final year, Samuelson took Jacob Viner’s 
graduate price theory course in which, to 
the delight of the graduate students—many 
of whom lived in terror of Viner’s socratic 
method combined with a three-mistakes-
and-you-are-out rule—Samuelson used to 
point out mistakes on the blackboard. It was in 
Chicago that Samuelson decided that learn-
ing mathematics would help his economics, 
something that was far less obvious then 
than it is today. A graduate student, George 
Stigler, had exposed Samuelson to the joys of 
large determinants, showing him notes on a 
course taught by Henry Schultz, and Viner 
explained that calculus was a prerequisite 
for a proper understanding of indifference 
curves and production possibility frontiers, 
though admitting that he did not understand 
it himself (Samuelson 1972b, p. 911). Having 
taken Elementary Mathematical Analysis at 
the end of his junior year, Samuelson appears 
to have taken as much mathematics as he 
could in his senior year, with courses in sta-
tistics, algebra, plane analytic geometry, and 
calculus. After graduating, he took a summer 
course in differential equations. 
However, though it was at Chicago that he 
had decided to become an economist and that 
he had realized the importance of mathemat-
ics, the most important part of Samuelson’s 
education took place at Harvard, where he 
took courses from 1935–37, before becom-
ing a junior fellow, turning out paper after 
paper, from 1937–1940. By the time his the-
sis was submitted, he had published twenty 
articles covering consumer theory, capital 
theory, international trade, unemployment, 
and business cycle theory and was widely 
considered to be the leading young economic 
theorist. He was using mathematical tech-
niques that left most of his teachers behind. 
Though he acknowledged the importance 
of Joseph Schumpeter, Wassily Leontief, 
Gottfried Haberler, and Alvin Hansen in 
teaching him modern economic analysis (see 
also Samuelson 1976, p. 27), he made it clear 
that the main influence on Foundations was 
Edwin Bidwell Wilson. He took Wilson’s 
courses in mathematical economics and 
mathematical statistics, and spent hours 
talking to him after lectures (Samuelson 
1972a). In “How Foundations Came to Be,” 
he confined himself to saying that Wilson 
had vaccinated him to understand that eco-
nomics could use the same mathematics as 
physics without resting on the same empir-
ical foundations and certainties (Samuelson 
1998, p. 1376). Wilson had, he claimed, 
contempt for social scientists who aped the 
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natural sciences “in a parrot-like way.”13 To 
find more detailed statements about what he 
learned from Wilson, it is necessary to look 
elsewhere in his writings (e.g. 1947, p. 81; 
Samuelson 1972c, p. 254; Samuelson 1965b, 
p. 438; Samuelson 1967 [CSP], pp. 655, 673)
Schumpeter acted as Samuelson’s mentor 
for many years. He taught the main graduate 
economic theory course, which Samuelson 
later praised for the range of topics and 
authors it covered (Samuelson 1951, p. 102). 
They became close and Schumpeter con-
tinued to support him, commenting on his 
papers and giving feedback on his first pre-
sentation to an AEA meeting (in a session 
Schumpeter chaired). Schumpeter was an 
enthusiast for mathematical economics but 
his command of mathematics was weak. 
He inspired many students and it is pos-
sible to see Samuelson as having achieved 
the breakthrough in mathematical econom-
ics that Schumpeter sought but could not 
achieve himself. It was Leontief, better 
trained in mathematics and, by 1935, teach-
ing the course that Schumpeter had set up 
to improve the teaching of mathematical 
economics, who provided Samuelson with 
a more rigorous training in formal eco-
nomic theory than Schumpeter was able to 
provide.
Though Samuelson disparaged Edward 
Chamberlin (placed just below Burbank 
in his roll of antisemitic dishonor), claim-
ing that at the age of thirty-five, he was 
already at the zenith of his scholarly career 
(Samuelson 2004, p. 4), his publications 
show that he thoroughly absorbed the con-
tent of Chamberlin’s Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition (1933), covered extensively in 
a course Samuelson took from him in 1935 
and also covered in Schumpeter’s economic 
theory course. Haberler, whom Samuelson 
remembered much more positively, was 
13 This countered the claims of Mirowski (1989), whose 
work he considered completely mistaken.
important because Samuelson’s theory of 
revealed preference (1938b; 1939c) grew 
out of Haberler’s theory of index numbers.
My own work in this direction grew out of a 
remark made to me by Professor Haberler 
in his 1936 international trade seminar at 
Harvard. “How do you know indifference 
curves are concave?” My quick retort was 
“Well, if they’re not, your whole theory of 
index numbers is worthless”. Later I got to 
thinking about the implications of this answer 
(disregarding the fact that it is not worded 
quite accurately). Being then full of Professor 
Leontief’s analysis of indifference curves, I 
suddenly realised that we could dispense with 
almost all notions of utility: starting from a few 
logical axioms of demand consistency, I could 
derive the whole of the valid utility analysis as 
corollaries (Samuelson 1950, pp. 369–70).
Samuelson’s theory of revealed preference 
resulted from seeing that Haberler’s own the-
ory of index numbers could be used to show 
that Leontief, who used indifference curves 
in his trade theory, was right to assume that 
indifference curves were concave.
2.2 Edwin Bidwell Wilson
Edwin Bidwell Wilson is not well known 
among economists, but his importance to 
Samuelson and hence to Foundations can-
not be overstated. Wilson was one of the two 
protégés of the great American physicist, 
Willard Gibbs, leading Samuelson repeat-
edly to express his admiration for Wilson 
by claiming Gibbs as his intellectual grand-
father (this analogy would, of course, imply 
that Irving Fisher, Gibbs’s other protégé, 
was his uncle) (e.g. Samuelson 1969, p. 10). 
Wilson had been trained in mathematics at 
Yale, where he wrote a book on vector anal-
ysis based on Gibbs’s lectures, establishing 
what has since become standard notation, 
and the Ecole normale supérieure in Paris. 
“The so-called foundations of geometry” 
(Wilson 1903) took on the leading pure math-
ematician of his day, David Hilbert, criticizing 
his use of set theory and logic. After a brief 
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spell at Yale, Wilson joined MIT as Professor 
of Mathematical Physics in 1907, where he 
wrote textbooks on calculus and aeronautics. 
In 1922, he moved to Harvard as Professor of 
Vital Statistics in Harvard’s School of Public 
Health, where his publications included arti-
cles on confidence intervals in statistics. His 
contribution to the Economics Department’s 
teaching was courses in mathematical eco-
nomics and mathematical statistics that he 
taught in alternate years. In the course on 
mathematical statistics taken by Samuelson 
in the spring of 1936, Wilson spent several 
weeks on the first twelve pages of Arthur 
Bowley’s Mathematical Groundwork of 
Economics (1924), his reason for proceeding 
so slowly being that “some of our high-pow-
ered mathematical economists did not know 
their fundamental definitions and would read 
right over a pair of statements that were con-
tradictory and assume that both were right.”14 
The previous year, he had published an article 
in which he pointed out that, though Bowley 
referred to the marginal utility of money in 
discussing consumer theory, it was only its 
rate of change that entered into his proof.
However, whilst it seems certain that 
Wilson will have raised questions about the 
significance of the notion of utility to con-
sumer theory, on which he had himself just 
published (Wilson 1935), Samuelson’s main 
debt to him lay elsewhere. It was Wilson 
who stimulated Samuelson’s lifelong inter-
est in thermodynamics and the realization 
that economists could learn from physics.15 
Though politeness no doubt lay behind 
the remarks, there is no reason to doubt 
Samuelson’s observation, made to Wilson 
when he left Harvard,
I have benefitted from your suggestions, per-
haps more than from anyone else in recent 
14 Wilson, July 14, 1936, Letter to John D. Black, 
EBWP Box 27 (B 1935-6).
15 See Samuelson’s answers to questions posed by 
Donald A. Walker in 1992, PASP Box 152 (Walker), p. 3.
years, and even chance remarks which 
you have let fall concerning Gibb’s [sic] 
 thermodynamical systems have profoundly 
altered my views in corresponding fields of 
economics.16
For Wilson, the main things that economists 
had to learn from physics were how to build 
up an exact argument and how, when faced 
with difficult factual problems, to apply 
existing mathematical tools and develop 
new ones. After attending his lectures, 
Schumpeter wrote to Wilson, explaining why 
he found the lectures valuable.
I was strongly impressed with the immense 
value to the economist of such lectures as you 
gave in the first part of the course. I perfectly 
agree with those who object to the practice of 
some economists, simply to copy out what they 
believe is an economic argument from text-
books of pure mathematics or of theoretical 
mechanics or physics, and I hope you will not 
interpret what I am about to say in the sense 
of that practice, which sometimes comes near 
being ridiculous.
But it is one thing to copy and another thing 
to learn how to apply existing, and to derive 
the stimulus for constructing new, mathe-
matical tools in the face of difficult factual 
patterns. We must not copy actual arguments 
but we can learn from physics how to build 
up an exact argument. Moreover we can learn 
to understand the relation of mathematics to 
the reality to which it is applied. Most import-
ant of all is the consideration that there are 
obviously a set of concepts and procedures 
which, although belonging not to the field of 
pure mathematics but to the field of more or 
less applied  mathematics, are of so general a 
character as to be applicable to an indefinite 
number of different fields. The concepts of 
Potential or Friction or Inertia are of this kind, 
and the problems and difficulties to which they 
give rise are formally much the same, whatever 
the subject matter.17
16 Samuelson, October 9, 1940, Letter to Wilson, 
EBWP Box 35 (S).
17 Schumpeter, J.A., May 19, 1937, Letter to Wilson, 
EBWP, Box 29 (S 1937).
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The examples Schumpeter cited (potential, 
friction, inertia) were presumably ones that 
Wilson had discussed.
This view is precisely the one that 
informed Samuelson’s use of mathematics. 
He learned from Wilson that there were 
similarities between the structures of eco-
nomic problems and certain problems in 
physics and that, even though the evidential 
basis for the two disciplines was different, he 
could make use of these similarities to solve 
economic problems without implying that 
there was any deeper relation between the 
physical and the economic concepts. The 
main example of this was the Le Chatelier 
principle, the idea for which he attributed 
specifically to Wilson’s lectures:
In particular, I was struck by his statement that 
the fact that an increase in pressure is accom-
panied by a decrease in volume is not so much 
a theorem about a thermodynamic equilibrium 
system as it is a mathematical theorem about 
surfaces that are concave from below or about 
negative definite quadratic forms. Armed with 
this clue, I set out to make sense of the Le 
Chatelier principle. (Samuelson 1972c, p. 254)
Though the status of the Le Chatelier princi-
ple in physics and chemistry has been much 
debated, for Samuelson it was a result that 
held in any equilibrium system, whether 
physics, chemistry, or economics. This was 
an important idea in his later work. It should 
be noted that though accounts of it are often 
couched in terms of differential calculus, the 
principle is much more general and applies, 
as Samuelson showed, equally to systems in 
which discrete choices mean that there is no 
smooth substitution between variables.18 
Samuelson learned from Wilson the impor-
tance of basing economic theory on pre-
cisely specified postulates and of  analyzing 
18 Milgrom (2006) discusses subsequent attempts to 
generalize the conditions under which the principle holds, 
including ones by Samuelson.
the general case where functions were not 
necessarily smooth and differentiable. Their 
correspondence makes it clear that Wilson 
pushed Samuelson to analyze finite changes 
and, as Gibbs had done, to base conclusions 
on inequalities linked to generalized notions 
of convexity. Directing Samuelson to the 
types of mathematics on which he was to rely 
in much of his work, Wilson recommended 
The Calculus of Observations (Whittaker 
and Robinson 1926), which discussed many 
of the techniques that Samuelson was later 
to use in Foundations, and which marked his 
book out from previous work on the subject. 
It focused on methods for obtaining numer-
ical solutions, beginning with interpolation, 
difference equations, determinants, lin-
ear equations, and statistical theory (linear 
regression and correlation analysis).
Wilson was also important in stimulating 
Samuelson’s views on dynamics and com-
parative statics. Crucial evidence comes in 
a letter dated December 30, 1938, in which 
Wilson wrote detailed comments on a paper 
Samuelson had recently shown him.19 Even 
if Samuelson’s paper were an early attempt 
at tackling the relations between dynamics 
and comparative statics, the letter showed 
that he had not yet sorted out the material to 
Wilson’s satisfaction.20 Wilson thought that 
Samuelson’s analysis might not be “so gen-
eral in some respects as Willard Gibbs would 
have desired.” Samuelson had written of cer-
tain “secondary conditions” and of “a certain 
form being positive definite.” This caused 
Wilson to tell Samuelson that Gibbs used to 
talk of “non-negative quadratic forms” and 
that he used to lay great stress on the fact 
that it was important “to remain within the 
limits of stability.” Wilson appears to have 
19 Wilson, December 30, 1938, Letter to Samuelson, 
EBWP Box 31 (S 1938).
20 It not clear which paper this letter referred to, though 
it seems most likely that it was either this one or a draft of 
the corresponding chapter of his thesis.
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been telling Samuelson not only that he had 
not stated the second-order conditions for 
optimization correctly (positive definiteness 
was sufficient but not necessary), but also 
that second-order optimization conditions 
and stability were related, an idea that was to 
become central to Samuelson’s work.
Now if one wishes to postulate the derivatives 
including the second derivatives in an abso-
lutely definite quadratic form one doesn’t need 
to talk about the limits of stability because the 
definiteness of the quadratic form means that 
one has stability. (ibid.) 
In an optimizing system, second-order con-
ditions implied stability and vice versa. 
It is also significant that in the same letter, 
Wilson reminded Samuelson of the need to 
consider the more general case where func-
tions were not continuously differentiable.
He [Gibbs] doesn’t use derivatives but intro-
duces a condition which is equivalent to say-
ing that his function has to be on one side 
or in a tangent plane to it. He doesn’t even 
assume that there is a definite tangent plane 
but merely that at each point of his surface it is 
possible to draw some plane such that the sur-
face lies except for that point and some other 
points entirely to one side of the plane. (ibid.)
The mathematics of convex sets and separat-
ing hyperplanes, which is what Wilson was 
implicitly describing, was not well developed, 
and he went on to say “Just how general a 
theorem one can get I don’t know because 
I have never worked it out as carefully as I 
ought to have done.” However, it remained 
the case that Gibbs had pointed out that if 
one exceeded the limits of stability, the con-
ditions Samuelson assumed might not hold. 
Wilson’s final advice was that he needed to 
explain himself better: “a little more text and 
not so many formulae in proportion to the 
text might make the whole decidedly easier 
reading”—advice that Samuelson did not 
always take.
2.3 Marion Crawford
At Harvard he audited courses in 
thermodynamics and Fourier analysis. 
However, given the mathematics he used in 
Foundations, a particularly important course 
would seem to be one he took in the summer 
of 1936, at summer school at the University 
of Wisconsin–Madison. This was the theory 
of equations, taught by one of the few women 
in American mathematics, Margarete Wolf. 
She had obtained her PhD the year before, 
and two years later was to publish, jointly 
with her sister, a paper on the problems of 
deriving necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the existence of solutions to linear matrix 
equations and determining the number of 
solutions (Wolf 1936). Though this material 
may not have been covered in the course he 
took, it was very close to the topic of “systems 
of linear equations and determinants with 
applications” described in the course catalog. 
Given his exposure to Leontief’s input-out-
put analysis the term before, and his use of 
the textbook by Whittaker and Robinson, 
Samuelson could hardly have failed to see 
the significance of this material.
One reason for his going to Wisconsin that 
summer was that it was not far from the home 
of Marion Crawford, an economics major at 
Radcliffe College, whom he married in 1938. 
While he was taking courses in the theory of 
equations and functions of complex variables, 
she was studying money and banking (they 
took German together). After graduation, 
she worked as an assistant to Schumpeter, 
who rated her extremely highly. For her 
undergraduate dissertation (Crawford 
1937), she undertook a mathematical inves-
tigation of a concept that had only recently 
appeared in the literature, the elasticity of 
substitution, applying to it techniques in 
linear algebra that would have been beyond 
most  economists of the time (and which 
she must have discussed with Samuelson). 
Her only academic  publication was on  tariff 
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 protection in Australia (Samuelson 1939), 
and Samuelson later suggested that he might 
have learned more from this than he had 
acknowledged when he wrote the paper 
with Stolper on protection and real wages 
that was the first to use the term Heckscher–
Ohlin trade theory (Stolper and Samuelson 
1941; Samuelson 1994, p. 346). They wrote 
a joint paper on population dynamics, which 
remained unpublished. It is clear that her 
role in Foundations extended beyond the 
typing, for he wrote that her contributions to 
the book were “too many” and that “the result 
has been a vast mathematical, economic, and 
stylistic improvement” (Samuelson 1940, 
preface; Samuelson 1947, p. vii). Given her 
qualifications it seems likely that Samuelson 
was not exaggerating, though it is impossi-
ble to say where, on the spectrum running 
from copy editing to coauthorship, her input 
should be placed.21
3. The Thesis
In the middle of 1940, as his Junior 
Fellowship was coming to an end, he took 
the decision, with Marion, that it would be 
 prudent to obtain a PhD.22 He composed and 
rearranged material “at fever pace,” dictating 
some of the material to Marion, who typed 
the entire first draft of the thesis (Samuelson 
1998, p. 1377). It bore the subtitle, The 
Observational Significance of Economic 
Theory.23 His use of the term observational 
in the title is consistent with his definition 
of “operationally meaningful theorems” 
21 Samuelson always praised his fellow-students, argu-
ing that it was they, as much as their teachers, who were 
responsible for what he called Harvard’s golden age. 
However, aside from specific instances, such as his collabo-
rations with Abram Bergson and Gustav Stolper, their pre-
cise role in the evolution of his thinking is unclear.
22 Backhouse (2014) discusses this period of his life in 
detail.
23 In Foundations (1947, p. 7) he incorrectly claimed 
that the subtitle of the thesis was “The operational signifi-
cance of economic theory.”
as statements about the world that were in 
principle refutable (ibid., pp. 2, 3). This idea 
had been completely absent from his pub-
lications in 1937, the first hint of it coming 
in February 1938, in which he referred to 
his consumer theory, based on index num-
ber theory, as being “more directly based on 
those elements which must be taken as data 
by economic science” and “more meaning-
ful” in its formulation (Samuelson 1938b, 
p. 71). But this is no more than a hint. His 
first clear commitment to operational-
ism came in the paper he presented to the 
Econometric Society in December 1937 
(Samuelson 1938a). It is tempting to link this 
to discussions he had in the preceding three 
months in the Society of Fellows, where the 
weekly discussions over dinner were domi-
nated by physiologist Lawrence Henderson. 
Samuelson later played down the signifi-
cance of his contact with Henderson, though 
he had cited him when discussing opera-
tionalism in Foundations (1947, p. 5, n. 2). 
Henderson had used Gibbs’s mathematics 
to apply the idea of general equilibrium to 
physiology, and when he discovered Pareto’s 
sociology he saw that it could also be applied 
to social systems. Henderson organized the 
“Pareto Circle,” an interdisciplinary group 
exploring Pareto’s ideas, though Samuelson 
claims he found it of no interest and attended 
only once.24
The term “operational” inevitably con-
jures up the operationalism of the Harvard 
physicist, Percy Bridgman, which was widely 
known in the 1930s.25 Even if Samuelson had 
not attended Bridgman’s lectures on ther-
modynamics,26 he could hardly have avoided 
24 Weintraub (1991, chapter 3) presents the Pareto 
circle as part of the context out of which Foundations 
emerged.
25 For example, Harvard’s Stanley Stevens argued for 
operationalism in psychology.
26 He has stated that he took a course in thermodynam-
ics, and Bridgman taught the only course listed under that 
title.
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him, given Bridgman’s closeness to those 
running the Society of Fellows. However, 
the way Samuelson described operationally 
meaningful theorems, emphasizing “data” 
and “observation” (a term that is given 
prominence by its use in the thesis title) has 
much stronger echoes of the Vienna Circle 
ideas being developed by Rudolf Carnap, 
whom Samuelson’s friend Willard Quine 
had helped bring to the United States in 
1936, and whom Samuelson might also have 
encountered through Senior Fellow Alfred 
North Whitehead.27 
Operationally meaningful theorems could 
be derived using mathematics. Samuelson 
opened the thesis with a quotation, repro-
duced exactly in Foundations, from the 
mathematician E. H. Moore: “the existence 
of analogies between central features of 
various theories implies the existence of a 
general theory which underlies the partic-
ular theories and unifies them with respect 
to these central features” (Samuelson 1940, 
p. 1). He sought to apply this idea to eco-
nomics, presenting the theory underlying 
the theories of production, the consumer, 
international trade, the business cycle, and 
income determination. It had long been 
recognized that these all involved systems 
of interdependent equilibrium conditions, 
but the novelty was seeing that there existed 
“formally identical meaningful theorems” 
in all of these fields. Not only would he 
derive operationally meaningful theorems, 
but these theorems would be derived from 
a common set of underlying principles. The 
first source of results was that equilibria were 
often the solutions to optimization problems, 
for propositions about individuals could be 
derived from the hypothesis that “conditions 
of equilibrium are equivalent to the maximi-
zation (minimization) of some magnitude” 
(Samuelson 1940, p. 4). This was not an a 
27 One of Samuelson’s friends, Shigeto Tsuru, worked 
closely with Whitehead and took an interest in psychology.
priori truth but a hypothesis. The second 
was the assumption that an equilibrium must 
be stable, for otherwise it made no sense to 
analyze comparative statics results. This was 
necessary for the analysis of group behav-
ior because at this level nothing was being 
maximized.28
However, when we leave single economic 
units, the determination of unknowns is found 
to be unrelated to an extremum position. In 
even the simplest business cycle theories there 
is lacking symmetry in the conditions of equi-
librium, without which there is no possibility of 
reducing the problem to that of a maximum or 
a minimum. Here the hypothesis is made that 
the system is in stable equilibrium or motion 
in terms of an assumed dynamical system 
(Samuelson 1940, p. 4-5).
The justification for assuming stability was 
that “positions of unstable equilibrium, 
if they exist, are transient, non-persistent 
states” that will be observed less often than 
stable ones.
After these methodological and mathe-
matical preliminaries, Samuelson turned to 
“cost and production,” stressing that produc-
tion, value, and distribution were all aspects 
of a single problem. He was proposing a 
general theory and was trying to derive “all 
possible operationally meaningful theorems” 
(Samuelson 1940, p. 68). Given the tradi-
tional emphasis on derivatives and marginal 
conditions, he emphasized the need to con-
sider finite changes. 
It is curious to see the logical confusion into 
which many economists have fallen. The pri-
mary end of economic analysis is to explain 
a position of minimum (or maximum) where 
it does not pay to make a finite movement in 
any direction. Now in the case that all func-
tions are continuous, it is possible as a means 
towards this end to state certain equalities on 
differential coefficients which will (together 
with appropriate secondary conditions) insure 
28 Note that phrase he coined to describe this, the “cor-
respondence principle,” was not used at this point.
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that certain inequalities will hold for finite 
 movements. It is no exaggeration to say that 
infinitessimal analysis was developed with just 
such finite applications in view (Samuelson 
1940, p. 92).
Though influenced by Wilson on this point, 
it meant his arguments applied not just to 
traditional theory, but also to Leontief’s 
input-output models. 
This theme, that the existing literature 
was confused, continued in the next three 
chapters, in which he sought to show pre-
cisely what was contained in traditional 
utility theory. After a few pages on the evo-
lution of the concept of utility, he turned to 
a mathematical treatment of the problem, 
drawing on his early articles. Revealed pref-
erence and notions of indifference were 
used to show how meaningful propositions 
could be derived. He clarified the meaning 
of concepts such as cardinal utility, inde-
pendent utilities, and complementarity, and 
devoted a whole chapter to the problem 
of the constancy of the marginal utility of 
income, important because of the legacy of 
Marshall’s ideas and because of attempts 
that had been made by Chicago’s Henry 
Schultz to measure demand functions.
When he turned to dynamics, in the last 
two chapters of the thesis (covering mate-
rial that also appeared in 1941 and 1943a), 
he carried on in the same vein, criticizing 
 previous generations of economists for fail-
ing to investigate the character of the laws 
they claimed existed. If nothing is known 
other than that supply and demand deter-
mine prices, without knowing the shape of 
the functions, he claimed, “the economist 
would be truly vulnerable to the gibe that 
he is only a parrot taught to say ‘supply 
and demand’” (Samuelson 1940, p. 192). 
Economists needed to derive comparative 
statics results. The first of his chapters on 
dynamics linked this to the stability of equi-
librium. He then argued that  economists 
needed explicit dynamic models that 
explained how, starting from arbitrary initial 
conditions, all variables would change over 
time. This took the mathematical analysis to 
an even higher level, for it might be modeled 
using “differential, difference, mixed differ-
ential-difference, integral, integro-differen-
tial and still more general” sets of equations 
(Samuelson 1940, p. 196). Even if some of 
the ideas would have been familiar to econ-
omists, he was using mathematical language 
in a way that only a tiny minority of math-
ematical economists would have previously 
encountered. He then proceeded to discuss 
different types of stability, illustrating this 
with several economic examples, including 
the multimarket equilibrium system used 
by Hicks (1939) and a Keynesian system, 
such as James Meade, Hicks, and Oskar 
Lange were using. Though these were not 
the same type of supply and demand sys-
tem, he treated the Keynesian system as 
something analogous to the other market 
systems he had been discussing in his book. 
Given that it was not based on optimiza-
tion, this was the example that showed most 
clearly the importance of dynamics to com-
parative statics.
Samuelson achieved a number of things 
with these examples. The first was to show 
that dynamic processes were implicit in 
familiar economic examples, implying that 
economists could not argue that dynam-
ics was unnecessary. They might not talk 
in terms of explicit dynamic systems, but 
they were nonetheless using them. The 
second was to illustrate some of the dif-
ferent types of mathematics that could be 
used:  differential, difference, and integral 
equations. One of his examples also illus-
trated stability of the second kind and the 
notion that systems might be subject to ran-
dom shocks—that they might “take a ran-
dom walk” (Samuelson 1940, p. 207). He 
referred to Brownian motion of large mole-
cules undergoing random collisions, though 
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argued that before applying such ideas, 
with the possibility that movements might 
become more variable the longer a system 
was observed, in economics, “some statisti-
cal evidence of its possible  validity should 
be adduced” (Samuelson 1940, p. 208). 
Another example showed, through famil-
iar examples, that stability analysis was not 
an esoteric matter that economists could 
ignore, but that it was important for deriv-
ing comparative statics results. As in his 
previous chapters, the tone was of showing 
economists how to do properly the things 
that they had previously been trying to do 
without success.
Dynamic analysis also made it possible 
for Samuelson to introduce randomness 
(also in one of his earlier examples) and 
to relate economic theory to econometrics 
(as the term eventually came to be under-
stood). He provided a justification for rep-
resenting economic equilibrium “as simply 
a statistically fitted trend,” implying that the 
approach to data analysis represented by 
Henry Ludwell Moore and Henry Schultz, 
whose work he cited, might have rigor-
ous theoretical justification. Citing Lotka’s 
Elements of Physical Biology (1925), he 
noted that a dynamic equilibrium of supply 
and demand was “essentially identical with 
the moving equilibrium of a biological or 
chemical system undergoing slow change” 
(Samuelson 1940, p. 236). Here, and in 
his discussions of concepts of stability, he 
was moving away from economics into the 
realm of mathematics and physical systems 
in general. He was sketching directions in 
which economic analysis might develop.
4. From Thesis to Book
4.1 Chronology
Samuelson’s thesis was an obvious can-
didate for the Wells Prize for the best 
 publishable thesis in Economics, which 
brought the recipient $500 (equivalent to 
two months’ salary when he was appointed 
Assistant Professor at MIT in October 1940) 
and also covered the costs of publication of 
the thesis by Harvard University Press. He 
remembered being awarded the Wells Prize 
in 1941, saying that he then revised his  thesis 
whilst working on fire control (designing 
radar guidance systems for naval artillery) at 
MIT’s Radiation Laboratory, handing it in in 
1944 (Samuelson 1998, p. 1378). However, 
the Harvard Corporation ruled his thesis, 
examined in December, would not be con-
sidered that year. It was not until February 
10, 1942, that the department unanimously 
endorsed the recommendation, made by a 
committee comprised of Seymour Harris, 
Haberler, Leontief, and Hansen, to award 
Samuelson the prize.
By this time, Samuelson was in his second 
year at MIT, teaching courses in economic 
theory, mathematical economics (which 
had a course in differential equations as a 
prerequisite), and business cycles. He had 
also become involved, through Hansen, 
as a consultant for the Full-Employment 
Stabilization Unit at the National Resources 
Planning Board (NRPB), traveling to 
Washington every other week. His role 
there was to help assemble and supervise 
a team that was forecasting consumer 
demand under varying assumptions 
about the distribution of income across 
households. He was also getting involved in 
debates over the multiplier and the theory 
of income determination (e.g. Samuelson 
1942b, 1943b). In June 1943, the NRPB was 
disbanded, and his teaching commitments 
at MIT rose.29 In addition to his economics 
teaching, he also taught basic mathematics to 
U.S. Navy officers.30
29 This is discussed in Maas (2014).
30 The exact date and content of this teaching has not 
been established.
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To focus resources on the war effort, MIT 
closed down much of its economics teach-
ing for academic year 1944–45, and it was at 
this point, in March 1944, that Samuelson 
joined the Radiation Laboratory as a mathe-
matician in the theory group under physicist 
Ivan Getting. The pressure he was under, 
working 8.30 a.m. until 6 p.m., six days a 
week, able to work on his manuscript only 
in the evenings and on Sundays, no doubt 
explains why this stage of the process stuck 
in his memory. However, he had started 
revising the book much earlier, for on May 
29, 1942, he had told Harvard University 
Press that he was undertaking “fairly exten-
sive revisions” and that, due to his work at 
the NRPB, he would not be able to com-
plete it in that year.31 The description he 
provided of the book suggested that he was 
planning to extend its coverage of business 
cycle theory, a topic that he had covered 
only briefly in his thesis.
Progress continued to be slow, despite 
Samuelson having reported to Abbott 
Usher, Chair of the Harvard Economics 
Department’s publications committee, who 
was responsible for liaison with Samuelson 
and the Press, that he hoped to be able to 
finish it by September 1943.32 In August 
1943, he told Walter Salant, a friend from 
Harvard working in Washington with whom 
he was discussing the multiplier, that he was 
“on the home stretch.”33 However, in April 
1944, he told Wolfgang Stolper that it was 
only with great difficulty that he could make 
any  progress on “the remaining chapters 
of my own manuscript.”34 It would appear 
that at some point between these dates he 
31 Samuelson, June 28, 1942, Letter to David T. 
Pottinger, PASP Box 34 (H, 1940-57).
32 Samuelson, July 8, 1943, Letter to A. P. Usher, PASP 
Box 85 (Foundations).
33 Samuelson, August 11, 1943, Letter to Walter Salant, 
PASP Box 67 (Salant).
34 Samuelson, April 6, 1944, Letter to Abram Bergson, 
PASP Box 16 (Bergson).
had decided to include new material (the 
changes he made are discussed below). 
Given what he told Stolper, it seems unlikely 
that it could have been submitted before the 
summer of 1944. There was then the delay, 
discussed above, before the manuscript 
was submitted to the Press, during which 
he saw it gathering dust as he checked its 
progress once a month. (Samuelson 1998, 
p. 1378). Given that the book was sent to 
Harvard University Press in February 1945, 
this delay seems unlikely to have been 
more than a few months. If, as is possible, 
it had taken him a long time to overcome 
the difficulties he described to Stolper, in 
the limited time allowed by his work in the 
Radiation Laboratory, it could have been 
less than that.
4.2 New Material
The modifications he made to the thesis 
were very substantial and are summarized 
in table 1. The most prominent change was 
the introduction of the “correspondence 
principle.” In the introduction to the thesis, 
Samuelson had explained the link between 
comparative static and dynamic theory by 
writing, “Here the hypothesis is made that 
the system is in stable equilibrium or motion 
in terms of an assumed dynamical system. 
This implies no ideological or normative 
significance. . .” (Samuelson 1940, p. 4). In 
Foundations, that became:
Instead, the dynamical properties of the sys-
tem are specified, and the hypothesis is made 
that the system is in “stable” equilibrium or 
motion. By means of what I have called the 
Correspondence Principle between compara-
tive statics and dynamics, definite operation-
ally meaningful theorems can be derived from 
so simple a hypothesis. One interested only in 
fruitful statics must study dynamics.
The empirical validity or fruitfulness of the 
theorems, of course, cannot surpass that of 
the original hypothesis. Moreover, the stability 
hypothesis has no teleological or normative sig-
nificance … (Samuelson 1947, p. 5).
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TABLE 1 
Foundations in relation to Samuelson’s PhD Thesis
Chapters in Foundations Pages Material added to/removed from thesis
I. Introduction 5–6 Discussion of correspondence principle
II. Equilibrium Systems and Comparative Statics None
III. The Theory of Maximizing Behavior 23–29 New section: A Calculus of Qualitative 
 Relations
IV. A Comprehensive Restatement of the Theory 
of Cost and Production
78–80 New section: Indeterminacy in Purest 
 Competition?
V. The Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behavior 117–124 New section: A Note on the Demand for 
Money
VI. Transformations, Composite Commodities, 
and Rationing
125–171 New chapter
VII. Some Special Aspects of the Theory of 
 Consumer’s Behavior
179 Paragraph on independence added
184–189 Discussion of Value and Capital and 
complementarity added
189–202 Three sections, Constancy of Marginal Utility 
of Income and two on consumer’s surplus, are a 
completely rewritten version of a thesis chapter, 
reflecting the content of Samuelson 1942a
VIII. Welfare economics 203–253 New chapter
IX. The Stability of Equilibrium: Comparative 
Statics and Dynamics
258 Sentence on correspondence principle added 
since Samuelson 1941
266 Figure illustrating offer curves added in 
Samuelson 1941
272 Two sentences on imperfect stability omitted 
since Samuelson 1941
274–275 Discussion of Lange 1942 and Lange 1944 
added since Samuelson 1941
X. The Stability of Equilibrium: Linear and 
 Non-linear Systems
284–310 New chapter (Samuelson 1942c)
XI. Some Fundamentals of Dynamic Theory 311–317 New Section: Statics and Dynamics. All but 
one page is included in Samuelson 1943a.
327 Final paragraph on stability of equilibrium 
changed
330–332 Discussion of “what processes shall be 
described as equilibrium processes?” added
334 Phrase “physical systems” corrected to 
“conservative physical systems”
335–349 Six sections on business cycles added
XII. Conclusions 350–355 New chapter
Appendix A: Maxima and Quadratic Forms 379 Two clarificatory sentences added
Appendix B: The Theory of Difference and Other 
Functional Equations
380–439 New chapter
Note: Pages are those on which significant changes have been identified. Only those articles published after the 
thesis are mentioned.
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The content of his argument had not 
changed, but Samuelson had introduced a 
name for the idea and had elevated it to the 
status of a “principle.”35 Samuelson clearly 
thought that his work was in the forefront 
of a radical change that was taking place in 
economics.
An understanding of this principle [the 
Correspondence Principle] is all the more 
important at a time when pure economic the-
ory has undergone a revolution of thought—
from statical to dynamical modes. While many 
earlier foreshadowings can be found in the lit-
erature, we may date this upheaval from the 
publication of Ragnar Frisch’s Cassel Volume 
essay of only a decade ago. The resulting 
change in outlook can be compared to that 
of the transition from classical to quantum 
mechanics. And just as in the field of physics it 
was well that the relationship between the old 
and the new theories could be in part clarified, 
so in our field a similar investigation seems 
in order (Samuelson 1942c, p. 1; Samuelson 
1947, p. 284, emphasis added).
It is hard not to speculate that he had in 
mind Keynes’s implied comparison of the 
revolution to be wrought by his General 
Theory with that brought about by Einstein 
in physics.36 
The new material on business cycle  theory 
(Samuelson 1947, pp. 335–49) was less a 
survey of business cycle than a survey of 
the different mathematical methods that 
could be used to model the cycle. This was 
a topic on which many economists in several 
government agencies were actively working, 
Samuelson being one of many economists in 
government service and academia trying to 
forecast whether the end of the war would be 
followed by depression, as had happened after 
the First World War. The basic distinction 
35 The index entry for “Correspondence principle” gives 
three additional pages. On one, the phrase is not used, and 
the remaining two are in a new chapter.
36 He would be familiar with Pigou’s (1936, p. 115) 
remark that Einstein actually did for physics what Keynes 
claimed to have done for economics.
he made was between endogenous models 
(which explained the cycle as  self-generating, 
determined by factors within the system being 
analyzed) and exogenous theories (which 
explained fluctuations in terms of factors out-
side the model). The problem of endogenous 
theories was that they required that there 
was no damping—that the parameters of the 
economic system were such as to generate a 
system where fluctuations neither faded away 
nor exploded. In physics there were constants 
that might generate such systems, but there 
was no reason to assume such constants in 
economics. Thus he was critical of Michał 
Kalecki (1935) for imposing the condition 
that cycles not be damped. This was a milder 
version of an even more critical appraisal of 
Kalecki that he had made privately in a letter 
to Hurwicz:
By the way, have you read Kalecki’s most 
recent “Studies in Economic Dynamics”? He 
has a chapter on “pure” business cycle which, 
in my humble opinion, hits the low as far as 
method is concerned. In order to obtain his 
favorite mixed difference-differential equa-
tions he approximates differences by deriva-
tives, but not all the way thru—then he would 
have had a simple differential equation. Also, 
he makes it non-linear to maintain stability 
regardless of coefficients, but he does not inte-
grate the system explicitly, nor even write out 
the non-linear term.37
Samuelson then explained that the problem 
with linear endogenous models was that they 
could not explain the amplitude of the cycle: 
as with a pendulum, the amplitude could be 
of any magnitude, depending on where the 
system started. One way round the problem 
was to drop the assumption of a purely endog-
enous cycle and to assume that external fac-
tors kept the system going (though he did not 
cite it at this point, this was Frisch’s “rocking 
horse” model of the cycle, according to which 
37 Hurwicz, L., August 29, 1944, Letter to Samuelson, 
PASP Box 39 (Hurwicz).
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a rocking horse hit periodically by outside 
shocks would exhibit a continuing cycle). The 
other was to go for a nonlinear model, citing 
several references to the literature on the use 
of such models in physical systems. An exam-
ple of such systems was “billiard table” theo-
ries, such as Harrod’s (1936) in which output 
moved between a full-employment ceiling and 
a floor. A problem here was that Hansen had 
shown that there was “no (relevant) natural 
bottom to the economic system” (Samuelson 
1947, p. 340). He favored mixed endogenous–
exogenous systems, citing his own work on 
the multiplier-accelerator model (Samuelson 
1939b; Samuelson 1939c). His point here 
was that if the multiplier-accelerator model 
were augmented with a periodic movement 
such as a sine wave (though not necessarily a 
sine wave), the system would, subject to cer-
tain conditions, settle down to a periodicity 
determined by the exogenous factor. He lik-
ened this to the physical phenomenon of res-
onance. In such a system, shocks would break 
into this, producing shorter cycles.
Finally, he turned to “Mixed systems of a 
linear stochastic type”—linear models sub-
ject to random shocks. Such models had been 
analyzed by the Russian economist, Eugen 
Slutsky, and Frisch (1933), whose paper 
he described as brilliant, but Samuelson 
linked it to Fourier analysis and his MIT col-
league, Norbert Wiener. What is significant 
about this is that he linked this approach 
to the cycle to the problem of estimation, 
citing Trygve Haavelmo’s “The Probability 
Approach in Econometrics” (1944) and work 
by Abraham Wald. Though it was technically 
much more difficult, he also outlined the 
problem of modeling the cycle as a nonlinear 
stochastic system.
New material in part I included a chapter, 
“Transformations, Composite Commodities 
and Rationing” that tackled problems that 
were of great practical importance in war-
time (rationing and index numbers) and 
which he had confronted in his work on 
consumer demand. This provided him with 
the opportunity to tackle a range of issues 
in consumer theory, notably generalizing 
a theorem from Value and Capital (Hicks 
1939) on aggregation. However, the most 
substantial addition to part I was a fifty-page 
chapter on welfare economics that became 
the canonical statement of what came to be 
known as Bergson–Samuelson social welfare 
functions. He included this, he explained in 
a letter to Viner, “because the condition of 
the current literature seemed to me to be in 
a rather scandalous state of confusion and 
ignorance.”38 Though there was nothing on 
this topic in his thesis, the origins of these 
ideas go back to 1936–37 when Samuelson’s 
fellow student Abram Bergson (formerly 
Burk) kept asking him, “What can Pareto 
mean by this 1898 use of the French singu-
lar when he speaks of ‘the social optimum?’” 
(Samuelson 1981, p. 224). The problem was 
that Pareto referred to a social optimum as if 
it were a single point, yet the conditions he 
proposed did not seem to define any unique 
point. They solved it by making a clear sepa-
ration between ethical value judgements and 
empirical propositions. Bergson (Burk 1938) 
used this distinction to sort out confusing 
claims that had been made about welfare in 
the 1930s. Though Samuelson (1939a) had 
discussed welfare in the context of inter-
national trade, his first comprehensive dis-
cussion of welfare came in this chapter in 
Foundations.
Samuelson’s starting point was a func-
tion that was even more general, and 
with less content, than Bergson’s, for 
it began with a social welfare function, 
W = W( z 1 ,  z 2 , …) where the z’s are any 
variables that are thought relevant to social 
welfare. Any statement about what the 
z’s were involved making ethical judge-
ments. Unlike Hicks, who tried to eliminate 
38 Samuelson, April 9, 1948, Letter to Jacob Viner, 
PASP Box 74 (Viner).
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 ethical  judgements from welfare  economics, 
Samuelson sought to establish what ethical 
judgements needed to be made in order to 
derive conclusions about welfare. He began 
with widely accepted judgements, such as 
that individuals’ preferences “count” (not 
true, he claimed, for Nazi and Communist 
“totalitarian” states) before moving on to 
more controversial ones, such as those 
involved in assuming that welfare was the 
sum of cardinal utilities. Assuming no more 
than that individuals’ preferences counted 
(implying a social welfare function of the form 
W = W( U 1 (·),  U 2 (·), …), and that utilities 
depended on goods consumed and produc-
tive services supplied, he showed that, to 
use terminology introduced by Ian Little 
(1950) shortly afterwards, there was an 
infinity of Pareto optima. All that the pro-
duction and exchange conditions could do 
was to establish that there was an equation 
relating the well-being of different people 
in the system: a “utility possibility function” 
that determined the maximum utility any 
person could achieve given the utilities of 
everyone else.
Though it rested on different founda-
tions, Samuelson claimed that this analysis 
of welfare economics completed his static 
analysis of maximization. Because it was less 
clear what should be maximized, the nature 
of the discussion had to be very different, 
focusing on conceptual, more philosoph-
ical problems. Scientific economic analy-
sis might not be able to arbitrate between 
competing value judgements, but it could 
analyze the implications of different sets of 
values.
5. The Reception of the Book
Despite his youth, Samuelson was 
already well known by 1947, with around 
fifty academic papers to his credit, and the 
 publication of his thesis was eagerly awaited. 
Reviewers greeted it with great enthusiasm 
as a very important contribution to eco-
nomic theory (for example, Boulding 1948; 
Tintner 1948; Reder 1948; Allen 1949; 
Stolper 1949). This may be because most of 
them were mostly young, as few of the older 
generation would have been able to follow 
the book.39 The mathematical appendices 
were welcomed as providing much-needed 
teaching materials, though the book stim-
ulated discussion of the role of mathemat-
ics in economics, still a controversial issue 
(e.g., Boulding 1948, Savage 1948). The 
teaching of economic theory was still dom-
inated by Alfred Marshall’s Principles of 
Economics (1920), which reflected the view 
that mathematical reasoning should be kept 
strictly subordinate to verbal explanations. 
In his introduction, Samuelson (1947, p. 6) 
argued that Marshall’s position should be 
“exactly reversed” on the grounds that “the 
laborious literary working over of essen-
tially simple mathematical concepts such 
as is characteristic of much of modern eco-
nomic theory is not only unrewarding from 
the standpoint of advancing the science, but 
involves as well mental gymnastics of a par-
ticularly depraved type.” Where Marshall 
had relegated mathematics to footnotes and 
appendices, Foundations sought to demon-
strate what could be achieved through using 
mathematics in economics. Not surprisingly, 
some reviewers took up the comparison 
with Marshall. For example, Reder (1948, 
p. 516) characterized Marshall as having 
sought to clarify concepts, using mathemat-
ics when it served that purpose, whereas 
Samuelson “begins with systems of equa-
tions and attempts to deduce their empirical 
39 Reviewers included (ages at the time in brackets) 
Roy Allen (41), Gerhard Tintner (40), Kenneth Boulding 
(37), George Stigler (36), Wolfgang Stolper (35), Lloyd 
Metzler (34), Kenneth May (32), Leonard Savage (30), 
Charles Carter (28), Melvin Reder (28), William Baumol 
(25). Samuelson’s fellow students in this list were Stigler (at 
Chicago), Metzler, and Stolper (at Harvard).
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or  operational implications,” concluding that 
if one follows Samuelson, mathematics is far 
more likely to be useful. In a similar vein, 
Allen (1949, p. 111) compared Marshall’s use 
of mathematics to the use of steel to provide 
scaffolding, whereas Samuelson used it as 
part of the structure.
Foundations was also compared with 
Hicks’s Value and Capital (1939), Reder 
and Allen providing extensive comparisons. 
Samuelson (1998, p. 1382) later described 
Hicks’s book as “an expository tour de force 
of great originality, which built up a reader-
ship for the problems Foundations grappled 
with and for the explosion of mathematical 
economics that soon came.” However, few 
reviewers saw the relationship in this way. 
According to Roy Allen (1949, p. 112), who 
had collaborated with Hicks on consumer 
theory in the early 1930s, Hicks had tried to 
work out “if not a complete economic theory, 
at least a full development of one particular 
line of approach”; in contrast, Samuelson 
tried to do no more than show the common 
mathematical basis underlying different 
fields of economics. More critically, William 
Baumol (1949, p. 159) noted that the book 
lacked a theoretical unity, some chapters 
amounting to “collections of his miscella-
neous thoughts and brilliant analytical sor-
ties lumped together on the basis of some 
tenuously established common characteris-
tic.” Tintner (1948) considered Samuelson’s 
treatment of uncertainty inferior to Hicks’s.
There was disagreement over which was 
the most original part of the book. For Lloyd 
Metzler (1948, p. 906), who had used simi-
lar methods, the part dealing with dynamics 
was most important. Samuelson had gone 
beyond Hicks in constructing formal dynamic 
 models. Yet many reviewers were disap-
pointed by this part of the book (e.g., Savage 
1948; Tintner 1948; Stigler 1948; Allen 1949; 
Baumol 1949). Three major problems were 
identified. Discussions of dynamics rested on 
very special assumptions meaning that there 
could be no confidence in the results; they 
focused on the mathematics, with very little 
economic content; and no attention was paid 
to expectations. Gerhard Tintner (1948, p. 
499), at the Cowles Commission, concluded 
that because Samuelson’s results were very 
limited, his methods needed to be combined 
with econometric methods so as to quan-
tify the theory. Samuelson, though he had 
undertaken empirical work on consumption 
and published papers on statistical theory, 
and though he worked with students (e.g. 
Lawrence Klein) and coauthors (e.g. Robert 
Solow) who did econometric work, never 
went down that route himself.40 
Several reviewers recognized that 
Samuelson did not see economics as synon-
ymous with constrained maximization using 
calculus-based techniques. Metzler (1948, 
pp. 905, 906) emphasized Samuelson’s 
departures from traditional theory, pointing 
out that he believed that the most important 
problems, including those dealing with the 
economy as a whole, could not be reduced to 
maximization problems and that he was cyn-
ical about consumer theory. Kenneth May 
(1948, p. 94), a mathematician, was left feel-
ing that the book contained “an implicit basic 
critique of economic theory” in that “much 
economic theory turns out to be banal or 
meaningless when stripped of its vague liter-
ary formulation.” Allen (1949, p. 113) noted 
that Samuelson stressed finite changes and 
discontinuity and Leonard Savage (1948, p. 
202), a statistician, noted that the economic 
theorist needed little math beyond “a few 
ideas about continuity and convexity.” 
Though Samuelson clearly attached 
importance to the Le Chatelier principle, 
this was not something that impressed his 
reviewers, whether economists or mathe-
maticians. The only reviewer to mention it 
(Baumol 1949, p. 160) did so in a footnote 
40 This is a substantial point that is beyond the scope of 
this paper and will be discussed in detail elsewhere.
345Backhouse: Revisiting Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis
pointing out that Samuelson had gotten a 
minus sign wrong. The reason was presum-
ably that, though the Le Chatelier principle 
had been an important step for Samuelson, 
it was not a necessary step: it was sufficient 
to begin with results on optimality conditions 
and the correspondence principle. Though 
Samuelson had stated (1947, pp. 38, 81) that 
the Le Chatelier principle played a role in 
natural science, his reference to the “meta-
physical vagueness” with which it was stated 
will not have encouraged economists to fol-
low this up.
The range of responses to Foundations 
showed that, unlike Value and Capital, 
Foundations could be interpreted in many 
ways. Though Samuelson remained skeptical 
about much of the “neoclassical” orthodoxy 
that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s—and 
his friend Metzler (1948, p. 905) had gone so 
far as to claim that Samuelson believed that 
“most of the important economic problems” 
could not “be reduced to simple problems 
of maximization”—Foundations provided a 
toolbox to which those who developed that 
orthodoxy could turn (exemplified by the 
case of Lucas, cited earlier). The techniques 
Lucas and others learned from Foundations 
increasingly dominated economic theoriz-
ing. For example, Don Patinkin’s reformula-
tion of monetary economics, Money, Interest 
and Prices (1956), central to discussions of 
macroeconomics in the 1960s and 1970s (see 
Backhouse and Boianovsky 2013), made use 
of Samuelson’s theory of revealed prefer-
ence, the correspondence principle, and his 
discussion of dynamics. 
Samuelson had seen the importance of 
methods that went beyond differential and 
integral calculus, and from the late 1940s 
onwards played a major role in the devel-
opment of linear modeling techniques, 
clarifying the relation of Leontief and activ-
ity-analysis models to traditional theory 
(1949), and working with Robert Dorfman 
and Robert Solow to produce a major  textbook 
on such methods, Linear Programming and 
Economic Analysis (Dorfman, Samuelson, 
and Solow 1958). Foundations came to be 
associated with what became the standard 
approach to theoretical modeling, relying 
heavily on the use of Lagrange multipliers 
and differential calculus, for Samuelson did 
not become involved in literature on the 
existence of general competitive equilib-
rium, and he remained a skeptic about game 
theory.41 As such methods came to be more 
widespread, and as more elegant techniques 
involving cost and expenditure functions 
came to be more widely used, the influence 
of Foundations declined.42 In part, of course, 
the decline was because methods that were 
once innovative came to be routine and unre-
markable. This explains the pattern of cita-
tions shown in Figure 1: citations reached a 
peak in the 1970s, the decade by which the 
use of mathematical methods became firmly 
established (see Backhouse 1998), but after 
that, Foundations was increasingly displaced 
by books covering newer and different 
techniques.43
6. Conclusions
Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic 
Analysis did much to define the way eco-
nomic theorizing was undertaken after the 
Second World War. It was important both 
because of its contents—it provided an 
41 This is another story that will be told elsewhere.
42 Later, when trying to generalize the theorem to apply 
to Leontief and other models (Samuelson 1960), he admit-
ted that he had failed to derive a result that applied more 
than locally. However, it seems unlikely that recognition of 
this played a role in the decline in citations of Foundations.
43 Sales figures for the period for the book’s early years 
tell an interesting story. In 1948–49 it sold over 3,000 cop-
ies. After the initial demand was met, average sales from 
1950–1954 were under 300 per year, which rose steadily to 
873 by 1962. The background to this steady rise in the late 
1950s is no doubt both the increased use of mathematics 
and the increased number of economists. To put this in 
perspective, AEA membership rose from 5,329 in 1947 to 
11,285 in 1962, with similar expansions in other countries.
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up-to-date toolbox for doing economics— 
and because Samuelson, despite being only 
thirty-two when the book was published, 
was already a well-known figure. He was 
widely considered the star of the generation 
of economists that had come of age during 
the Second World War, acknowledged by 
the award of the AEA’s first Clark Medal. 
He was already making his mark at MIT, 
where his presence was a major factor in 
the  transformation of a service department 
focused on teaching engineers into one of the 
leading American economics departments. 
His articles on fields as diverse as consumer 
theory, international trade, business cycle 
theory, and the Keynesian multiplier demon-
strated the way mathematics could be used 
to resolve confusions in literary accounts of 
economic theory. This gave Foundations, the 
 long-awaited revision of his PhD dissertation, 
a significance it would not otherwise have 
had. As economics became progressively 
more mathematical, with graduate students 
increasingly expected to construct formal 
models of maximizing consumers and firms, 
Foundations was widely seen as the canoni-
cal exposition of such methods. In addition, 
it was an important resource for anyone tack-
ling dynamics or welfare economics. 
This paper fills out Samuelson’s account of 
the book’s origins, as well as correcting some 
details. It makes clear the extent of his debt 
to E. B. Wilson, who not only drew his atten-
tion to thermodynamics, but also impressed 
upon him the importance of looking carefully 
at all the assumptions being made, the impor-
tance of analyzing finite changes and mod-
els in which functions were not  necessarily 
Figure 1. Citations of Foundations in JSTOR articles, 1948–2010
Source: http://dfr.jstor.org. Search for “Samuelson” and “Foundations of Economic Analysis,” restricted to 
academic articles. 
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 continuous and differentiable, and the rela-
tionship between comparative statics and 
stability. It also establishes that turning the 
thesis into a book was a long process, extend-
ing over two to three years, during which it 
almost doubled in length. The most notable 
additions included much of the material on 
dynamics and a completely new chapter on 
welfare economics, as well as the term “the 
correspondence principle.”
Central to Samuelson’s book was the 
idea that there were common mathemat-
ical structures underlying different prob-
lems, both within economics and across 
disciplines. Operational theorems could 
be obtained by analyzing the properties 
of the appropriate equilibrium systems. 
For problems involving consumers and 
the firm, this involved maximization and 
hence, the use of second order conditions. 
For problems involving aggregates where 
optimization was not involved, comparative 
statics results could be derived by assuming 
that the equilibrium was stable. The paper 
contends that, contrary to what some com-
mentators have claimed, what mattered to 
Samuelson was not the analogies with ther-
modynamics per se, but the mathematical 
structures on which certain physical, chem-
ical, and biological theorems were based. 
Results that might appear to be physical 
in origin could actually be mathematical 
implications of a system being in equilib-
rium. This was an argument for the use of 
mathematics in economics at a time when 
most economic theory was conducted using 
verbal reasoning.
Contrary to popular belief, as his close 
friend Metzler noted, Foundations reflected 
the view that there was much more to 
economics than optimizing behavior. 
Macroeconomics required different foun-
dations, for aggregate behavior could not be 
explained as the outcome of optimizations: 
hence the need for the correspondence 
principle. Though Wilson left a stronger 
mark on Foundations than did Samuelson’s 
other Harvard teachers, it is tempting to 
conjecture that Samuelson’s belief that 
there were strict limits to what could be 
achieved through the analysis of optimizing 
behavior reflected the influence of Alvin 
Hansen, who was emphatically not a mathe-
matical economist. For much of the period 
when Samuelson was revising Foundations, 
he was working with Hansen on macroeco-
nomic policy problems, notably estimating 
consumers’ expenditure and trying to fore-
cast postwar national income, for which 
the mathematical apparatus constructed 
in Foundations was of little use. Though 
the main influence of such work was on his 
introductory textbook (Samuelson 1948), 
which expresses a very different view of 
economics—more institutional and data-
driven—it is hard not to speculate that the 
view on which Metzler picked up reflected 
this work. His wartime teaching at MIT and 
interaction with policymakers had no doubt 
given Samuelson the opportunity to develop 
his expository skills. This was evident in the 
material he added, notably on index num-
bers and welfare economics, though in gen-
eral he failed to respond to Wilson’s advice 
to expand greatly the explanations of what 
he was doing with the mathematics, and 
most of the material taken from the thesis 
was unchanged. The book might be flawed, 
but neither the minor mistakes nor the fail-
ure to provide an integration of economic 
theory prevented it from being a resource 
on which many economists drew heavily 
during a period that was to witness a major 
transformation of the subject along lines 
that Samuelson helped lay down. 
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